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Abstract
The European Social Model involves among other things: fundamental social rights, social protection 
and social dialogue. The neoliberal path chosen by Europe combined with the financial crisis led to the intro-
duction of austerity measures that endanger key elements of that model. Europe and its Member States have 
common and national mechanisms to ensure distributive justice, citizens’ participation and the continuity of 
the European Social Model even when it is threatened by international financial conditions or the political 
choices of its rulers. As a part of the ETHOS Struggles for Justice – Impact of Social and EU Charters in times 
of crisis project2, our research aims to answer two leading questions: to what extent is the national social 
dialogue a democratic instrument that uses horizontal and democratic processes and whether it is a powerful 
instrument for the preservation of the European Social Model?
Our paper reports on the actual status and functioning of social dialogue as a mechanism to produce 
a more effective enjoyment of labour rights between the different political and social actors in Hungary. We 
interviewed key actors of trade unions and confederations, lead character of an employers’ association, and 
analysed the relevant international and national legal framework concerning social dialogue. The case studies 
focus on two special – strongly polarised and politicised – areas: healthcare and public education. Interviews 
conducted with sectoral representatives aim to find out the different perceptions about the practices of social 
dialogue and social partners’ views on the role of the state in social dialogue.
Keywords: social dialogue, politicization, unions, public health care, public education system. 
1 Zsuzsanna Árendás: Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Sociology; Central European University, Center for Policy Studies/ 
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Introduction, Methodology
This article is part of a larger European research project ETHOS, Towards a European Theory of Justice 
and Fairness, which aims to discuss justice and equity in various European societies, including Hungary. Within 
this broad research area, the investigation this paper is linked to examined the influence of social rights and hu-
man rights charters following the world economic crisis, during the post-crisis restrictive economic measures. 
Among other things, we have focused on and examined the institutions and mechanisms connected to labour 
legislation, such as the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms and the institutions and procedures of 
social dialogue. The present article focuses on the latter issue, and defines social dialogue (SD) in a very broad, 
permissive sense, as any type of exchange of opinions, or dialogue taking place between the government, the 
employer (employers’ associations) and the representatives of the employees about actual socio-political and 
economic issues. Our presumption was that such a dialogue will positively influence the national policy-making 
processes. It was also presumed that the existence of such mechanisms can be considered a clear sign of the 
continuity of the European Social Model’s (ESM) achievements. As an extension of the main research question 
indicated above, we had several sub-questions we aimed to answer. We wanted to explore and understand 
the extent to which social dialogue as a democratic institution fulfils its role in Hungary, and whether and how 
it influences the various decision-making processes. As a follow-up to the previous questions, we wanted to 
explore to what extent Hungarian social dialogue is able to contribute to the sustainability of the ESM. 
Our research methods included desk research of the existing labour legislation and legal environment of 
the mechanisms and institutions of social dialogue in Hungary. We studied not only legal regulations, but also 
meeting minutes of key institutions of the national-level social dialogue. This provided us with a picture about 
the legal provisions and limitations, about the legal framework defining the mechanisms and institutional oper-
ations. However, our research did not stop here. We conducted several semi-structured interviews with major 
stakeholders in order to understand the everyday practices and interpretations of the main actors of SD in 
Hungary. We interviewed union representatives, leaders of major confederations in Hungary, representatives 
of employers’ organizations, leading figures of grassroot social movements active in the area of education, and 
unionists in the health care sector3. While the legal analysis was more or less feasible, interviews with major 
stakeholders were not always possible. Given the nature of the Hungarian state and its increasingly authoritar-
ian tendencies, those in charge of representing the government in the national-level forums of social dialogue 
did not feel the urge to talk to us researchers. Despite repeated written requests and telephone calls, such 
3 Altogether we have conducted 10 semi-structured interviews, and were involved in further informal discussions with people 
involved at some level of the SD in Hungary. 
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interviews could not take place. The missing government-side of the triangle is to some extent “reconstruct-
ed” through the narratives of formal partners in social dialogue: the union and confederation representatives 
and by employers’ association representatives. While we provided full anonymity to our interviewees, some 
expressed anxiety and fear about voicing critical opinions about governmental practices, in this case related to 
social dialogue. In some cases interviewees would not allow recording, others succumbed into self-censorship, 
while in other instances they “stood up” for their opinion and spelled out their dissatisfaction, disappointment 
or disillusionment with the direction social dialogue has taken in Hungary in the last decade or so. These highly 
critical opinions often linked the “problem” or dysfunctionality of SD to the larger socio-political context and 
the deteriorating state of democracy in Hungary. 
The role of social dialogue
The right to participate in decisions affecting one’s life is a basic value in a democratic society. This prin-
ciple should be present in all areas of civil society, encompassing political and economic spheres, including 
workplaces. Robert Dahl argues that people involved in certain kinds of human association possess a right, an 
inalienable right to govern themselves in democratic process, and if democratic decision-making is required 
at the state level, then it is also justifiable at the workplace level (Dahl 1985). Involvement in decision making 
which affects one’s life is an essential part of human dignity (Sinzheimer–Shumway 1920). The ‘voice of work-
ers’ has traditionally been represented by trade unions through collective bargaining (Bogg–Novitz 2012). 
Historically, industrial democracy became an effective force within the workers’ movement primary as 
an idea of representative democracy (Müller-Jentsch 1995). The principle of industrial democracy implies re-
placement of unilateral regulations with joint decisions on matters concerning workplaces or employment 
conditions. Thus, it is a socio-economic philosophy which proposes that citizenship rights in employment allow 
the workforce to partially or completely participate in running an industrial or commercial organization.
The system of workers’ participation in company-level decision-making shows considerable differences 
across Europe (Arrigo–Casale 2005). Neither the institutional structure nor the intensity of participation is 
consistent, due to differences in the basic philosophy of industrial relations between the Member States of 
the European Union. The most significant differences could probably be detected between the German, the 
Scandinavian and the Anglo-Saxon models. In the Anglo-Saxon system institutionalised workers’ participation 
shows little compatibility with the traditional pattern of industrial relations, whereas in Germany and in the 
Scandinavian countries industrial relations are cooperation-based. But even where institutionalised workers’ 
participation exists, it often remains on the level of mere information and consultation. The different culture 
of industrial relations results from the different political, cultural and economic developments of the Member 
States. In this heterogeneous situation, it would be largely unrealistic to shape the structure of workers’ par-
ticipation identically throughout the EU: the most that could be achieved is to approximate the systems in a 
functional sense (Weiss 1996).
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Social dialogue in the European social model
The overarching objective of Social Europe is to create a more equal society: ending poverty and poverty 
wages, while guaranteeing fundamental human rights, essential services and an income that enables every 
individual to live in dignity. The Commission’s 1994 White Paper on social policy (European Commission 1994) 
described a ‘European social model’ in terms of values that include democracy and individual rights, free col-
lective bargaining, the market economy, equal opportunities for all, social protection and solidarity. The model 
is based on the conviction that economic progress and social progress are inseparable. A defining feature of the 
European social model, when contrasted with that of the US, is the important role attributed to organisations 
of workers and employers in Europe.
There has been much academic and political debate whether it is possible to define a single European 
social model, or whether it would be more accurate to divide it into five different welfare state models, offering 
different approaches to the reduction of income inequality and poverty and to protection against uninsurable 
labour market risk (Bohle–Greskovits 2012). It is well established in the literature that national social policies 
in the Member States diverge in levels of generosity of social transfers and services, in their normative aspi-
rations and in their institutional structures (Hall–Soskice 2001) (Esping-Andersen 1990) (Farkas 2016). Even 
though national policies are quite different, it is agreed that well-functioning industrial relations at European, 
national, cross-industry, sectoral and company level, are crucial to the success and stability of the European 
social model. 
Social dialogue enables the social partners (representatives of management and labour) to contribute 
actively to designing social and employment policy, thus this institution is a fundamental component of the 
European social model. Such dialogue can promote agreements and policy measures that strike a balance 
between the interests of workers and employers. Under Article 151 TFEU, the promotion of dialogue between 
management and labour is recognised as a common objective of the EU and the Member States. The aim of 
social dialogue is to improve European governance through the involvement of the social partners in deci-
sion-making and implementation. The EU Charter enshrines the fundamental rights of association, information 
and consultation, and collective bargaining and action, anchors the role of the social partners in EU social pol-
icy, and ascribes legitimacy to collective bargaining and collective action, and to information and consultation 
at the level of the enterprise. European labour law has also established a general framework for improving 
information and consultation rights in the Member States, representing a crucial dimension of the European 
social model4 and in transnational companies with European Works Councils.5
Arguably, the European Social Model has been declining in the past two decades (F. Scharpf 2009, F. W. 
Scharpf 2002, Sapir 2006, Ferrera–Hemerijck–Rhodes 2007). The existing constitutional asymmetry between 
4 Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 establishing a general framework for inform-
ing and consulting employees in the European Community – Joint declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission on employee representation OJ L 80., 2002.3.23., 29—34. 
5 Directive 2009/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 on the establishment of a European Works 
Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of 
informing and consulting employees (Recast) OJ L 122 16.5.2009, p. 28.
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policies designed to promote market efficiency and social protection is striking (Schiek 2017). In the EU system 
of economic governance, labour market and social policy reforms remain in the domain of the Member States. 
European social policy making is hindered by these different national models, making it increasingly difficult 
to achieve the commonly agreed goals of social integration. Over the course of the recent economic crisis 
social dialogue came under increased pressure and at the same time was weakened by its decentralisation, 
a decline in bargaining coverage and state intervention in the area of wage policy (Kilpatrick–de Vitte 2014). 
Without consensus, governments and public authorities more frequently took unilateral decisions without 
social partner support. Against this background in November 2017, the Parliament, the Commission and the 
Council proclaimed the European Pillar of Social Rights. It provides, inter alia, for respect for the autonomy and 
the right to collective action of social partners and recognises social partners’ right to be involved in designing 
and implementing employment and social policies, including by means of collective agreements (European 
Comission 2016). Despite of the recurring challenges of the globalised economy, the EU’s social legislation 
provides an important safety net of minimum standards, preventing a downward spiral of social dumping 
(Vandenbroucke–Barnard–De Baere 2017).
Social dialogue in Hungary
The Hungarian labour market could be characterised by a moderate unemployment rate, a relatively low 
labour market participation rate and highly flexible labour market institutions (Köllő 2011). Union coverage has 
been radically declining and the unions have little power (Gyulavári–Kártyás 2016). Employment protection is 
lower than the EU average, while the adjustment of wages is also relatively easy (Eurofund 2019).  According 
to some research, the former Labour Code of Hungary was already one of the most liberal in Europe, but after 
the introduction of the new Labour Code in 2012 it got even more flexible (Kun 2014). 
The 2012 Labour Code pursued a new regulatory concept, and now allows collective agreements to de-
part from the provisions of the law without restriction, that is, even to the employee’s detriment. The new con-
cept allows social partners to have much more influence on shaping working conditions through agreements. 
Against this background it would have been necessary to reinforce the positions of the bargaining partners, 
especially that of trade unions. However, the new Labour Code significantly curtailed trade union rights at the 
workplace; and trade unions which had not been overly strong in the past either are in an increasingly difficult 
position when it comes to protecting employees’ interests (Kollonay Lehoczky 2015).
National economic and social council
After the abolition of the tripartite National Interest Reconciliation Forum in 2010 a two-tier social dia-
logue model has emerged in Hungary. On the one hand there is an official body which involves representatives 
from many different areas of the society, but which operates without any government agents. On the other 
hand, there is an informal council established by the government by a civil law contract, to which only selected 
organisations belong. The common denominator for these fora is that neither of them meet the requirements 
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for national level tripartite social dialogue set forth by ILO Convention No 144.6 In this section we analyse the 
operation of these interest reconciliation bodies. 
The National Economic and Social Council (NESC) is a consultative, drafting and advisory body inde-
pendent from Parliament and the Government, established to discuss comprehensive matters affecting the 
development of the economy and society, and national strategies across government cycles, and to promote 
the development and implementation of harmonious and balanced economic development and related social 
models.7 NESC is a six-sided body, operating with the participation of advocacy groups and organizations of 
employers and employees, national business chambers, NGOs active in the field of national policy, traditional 
churches,8 Hungarian representatives of academia both in and outside Hungary, and Hungarian representa-
tives of the arts both in and outside Hungary.9 NESC rights are narrowly formed, which reduces its importance 
as a consultative forum striving for national consensus in important economic and social questions. NESC is 
able to engage in consultation and accordingly give opinions, adopt positions, make proposals, adopt recom-
mendations and take decisions on its own initiative.
Albeit envisaged as a diverse consultative forum, NESC lacks the necessary elements to qualify as a na-
tional tripartite forum for social dialogue. First, it is not tripartite and due to its composition employers and em-
ployees always hold a minority position. Second the government is not represented on the council. Although 
of NESC’s agenda is set by government agents, ministers may attend its meetings in an advisory capacity. The 
lack of formal presence of the government signifies the weak position of the council.
Due to the diversity of the represented social groups, incapacity to achieve consensus is embedded 
in NESC’s composition. A leader of a government-critical confederation explained that NESC is too broad a 
platform with representatives of various organizations, including the huge, pro-government oriented body of 
artists, and religious leaders. Even the representatives of NGOs are selected from civil organizations who have 
received indirect support from the government. This composition is also detrimental to the quality of debates, 
as arguably there is no real contestation of ideas and arguments at the meetings. Although it was intended 
that it would be the forum which monitors the socio-economic development of Hungary, elaborates proposals 
for Parliament and the Government for the solution of comprehensive macro-economic and social problems 
and discusses government strategies and schemes in terms of employment policy and redistribution priorities, 
NESC has had few achievements. In addition to this, according to the contributions recorded during the meet-
ings, representatives do not always have the necessary professional knowledge to substantially contribute to 
the discussions.10 
6 The Convention on Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards), 1976 (No. 144). The Conventions provides for that Con-
tracting Parties undertake the duty to operate procedures which ensure effective consultations, with respect to the matters 
concerning the activities of the International Labour Organisation between representatives of the government, of employers 
and of workers, while employers and workers are represented on an equal footing on any bodies through which consultations 
are undertaken. Hungary ratified Convention C-144 in 1994.
7 Act No XCIII of 2011.
8 As specified by Act No CCVI of 2011.
9 Added by Act No CXXXIII of 2013.
10 For example in 2015 the churches side expressed its surprise that the minimum wage does not meet the minimum subsistence 
level, which had been the case since the introduction of this measure in 1989.
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The council’s impact on legislation and policy making is very debatable. According to the available infor-
mation, between 2010 and 2017 the council discussed 36 proposals, adopted two joint opinions, and estab-
lished a special committee, but it has not reached any agreements, which could be the most influential tool 
in the pool of its otherwise rather poor competencies.11 When we take a closer look at the achievements of 
the area where consensus was reached or an impact on legislation was made, this picture is even more unsat-
isfactory. The first joint opinion was adopted on the importance of maintaining a close relationship with the 
minority Hungarians living in Zakarpattya region (Ukraine), while the second one concerned the importance 
of a healthy lifestyle. The legislative measures adopted with regards to negotiations in NESC dealt with the 
allocation of EU funds for regional development programs.12 The special committee set up in 2014 intended to 
launch an investigation about homelessness after the presentation of the deputy state secretary of the Minis-
try of Human Capacities regarding regulatory changes in this area. However, other than two experts in the field 
being invited to hold presentations about homelessness at a plenary session of NESC, there are no records of 
any further impact of this committee.13 In other cases like social policy or economic reforms, recommendations 
made by the various sides of the council have been overlooked by the government.
The government does not consult the NESC about substantial topics, such as the minimum wage, social 
dialogue about which is a highly controversial issue in Hungary. The predecessor of NESC, the National Tripar-
tite Reconciliation Body, used to have codetermination rights concerning this issue, which meant that the gov-
ernment was unable to set a minimum wage without the consent of social partners.14 However consultation 
about the minimum wage, taxes and social contributions related to the field of employment now take place 
at a different forum, and the government only informs NESC about the outcome of these negotiations. This 
practice seriously undermines the significance of NESC as a genuine forum for social dialogue.
It is not only the debated topics that makes NESC a poor influencer, but also the lack of preparation for 
the meetings. Briefs often come right before the meetings, not allowing representatives to prepare for the 
debates. It was also mentioned during the interviews that preparatory documents are shallow and do not 
issues on their merits. For instance, for the meeting about the education system and its major problems or 
11 What added further challenge to the research is that although the Minister has to prepare a report on the output of NESC with 
special regards to its influence on the work of the Government by 31 March every year,  these reports are not always availa-
ble, and there are no available data for years 2013 and 2016.
12 Government decision No 1600/2012. (XII. 17.) and Government decree No 218/2009. (X. 6.) on enhancing the role of local govern-
ments.
13 For further details on the presentations see: Beszámoló az Autonóm Szakszervezetek Szövetségének 8. Kongresszus óta végzett 
érdekvédelmi tevékenységéről, 2014.
14 Incorporated in various laws, the government had to seek agreement from the social partners represented in Országos Érdek- 
egyezetető Tanács (OÉT) in areas listed exhaustively in the Labour Code of 1992 before issuing governmental decrees. Such ar-
eas were among others:  the national, statutory minimum wage, the maximum daily working hours and the number of public 
days off; the specific rules and measures on collective redundancies due to economic reasons, any other specific derogations 
from the general statutory rules on employment. Additionally, the Statute of OÉT provided for the co-determination right 
of social partners in other areas as well, like the rules of procedure and operation of the Labour Mediation and Arbitration 
Service. Co-determination right on minimum wage was abolished in 2009 by Act LXXIII of 2009 following the decision of the 
Constitutional Court (ABH 124/2008. (X. 14.) Constitutional Court decision). The Constitutional Court found co-determination 
right of OÉT unconstitutional as OÉT was not listed by the Constitution as a legislative body, yet its consensus was needed to 
issue a government decree.
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inadequacies the government provided a two-page brief, while the same issues had been very thoroughly ad-
dressed and analysed elsewhere by some professionals associated with platforms like the Civil Public Education 
Platform, active in education policy initiatives in recent years. 
Against this background it did not come as a surprise that interviewees perceived NESC as a poorly 
operating forum. One of the harshest comments from the interviews was made by a representative of the em-
ployers’ side about the functioning, or rather the lack of a functioning national forum for social dialogue: „the 
government states, or rather declares its intentions, others state their opinion, and then everyone goes home. 
Without any effect whatsoever. So, I would say its prestige is zero, no one ever takes it seriously. The govern-
ment has established it to be able to say that there is national level social dialogue in Hungary”.
Based on the meeting minutes and on the opinions of interviewed representatives, two trends could be 
observed in the operation of NESC: one is that the meetings have become less frequent, and the other is that 
subject matters have become vague and often politicised. How representatives perceive the operation and 
effectiveness of NESC is very much based on their political position. Pro-government trade unions and em-
ployers’ representatives often find the national level social dialogue to be functional and „normal”, „business 
as usual” with agendas and background materials based on which discussions are being held. These govern-
ment-friendly organizations help to legitimize and sustain the „feel” of a functional democratic system of social 
dialogue, while the government-critical confederations are left with a lot of frustration and feelings of help-
lessness, with occasional individual „attacks” against the meaningless procedures, trying to resist or counter 
the existing procedures with critical opinions, and professional background reports. As one of the interviewees 
stated „When I was chairing one of these sessions [in NESC], as I happened to be the head in rotation, I was 
openly critical of the position of one of the pro-government organizations [about the public education debate]... 
The state secretary, who happened to be present, quite cynically dismissed my points by saying that well, we 
know NN is getting his salary to say such things, so it’s fine, we understand...”
Interestingly, the government occasionally acts exactly according to the NESC recommendations but 
with significant delay, and it does not acknowledge any connection between the earlier recommendations and 
the newly introduced policies. This of course creates frustration in the confederations and trade unions and 
this course of action calls for explanation. Union representatives mostly agree that the government does not 
act as per recommendations even if they are sensible because of its highly authoritarian and undemocratic 
character. It does not want to listen and take advice on board because this is not the way it functions. „This 
government is not used to listening, everything is decided from above, from one person. They are not used to 
being told what to do.” As the interviewee suggests, it is equally a matter of political prestige, also the consider-
ation not to allow government-critical confederations (3 out of the 6 existing ones) to have their way, or for that 
matter any trade union or confederation to „dictate terms” and „to say what to do”. In this respect, according 
to the representative of a government-critical confederation, the more government-inclined confederations 
are not much better off either. „They just try to pretend that they are in the good books of the government, but 
I don’t think they have any real influence”.
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The permanent consultation forum
The Permanent Consultation Forum (PCF) was established by a civil law contract between the govern-
ment and the invited trade union federations and employers’ association. PCF is attended by the Prime Minis-
ter in person together with the State Secretary responsible for Employment Policy. The establishment of PCF 
was strongly debated as membership was only offered to selected trade unions and employer organizations, 
and some claimed the selection was arbitrary since no qualification criteria were communicated by the govern-
ment (Krén 2013). In 2012 the government invited three out of the six trade union confederations15 and three 
out the nine employer organizations16 to the forum to develop joint positions regarding employment, industrial 
development and its related socio-economic and financial aspects, including the policy on wage increments in 
the private sector. The reduced number of representatives seems to be practical, according to a representative 
of the major organization for employers. In his/her opinion, the principle of representativity was followed on 
both sides, and the selected major organizations stand for the bulk of employers and employees. However, 
there seem to be serious concerns regarding the functioning of this forum in terms of its efficiency and wheth-
er it represents a valuable social dialogue at all.
Even though the government is represented at its meetings, PCF does not operate as a genuine tripartite 
consultation forum for two reasons. First, since the forum was established by a civil law contract it lacks the 
necessary legal basis. Without legal regulations, the government’s obligations and the social partners’ rights re-
main unclear and – as could be seen through the example of fringe benefits – assumed rights are not enforce-
able. Therefore, the government in not obliged to consider proposals put forward by employers’ organisations 
or trade unions. Second, PCF works in a completely non-transparent manner: the agenda and minutes are not 
available, and decisions are communicated via press conferences, even though its operational cost is covered 
by the government.
Based on available data PCF has a leading role in consulting the government about statutory minimum 
wages. Usually negotiations are in late November and their results are communicated to the public and NESC 
afterwards. For example in November 2016 the government and PCF signed an agreement to settle minimum 
wages for the following three years.17 Apart from that PCF does not have a well-defined work-program or a 
yearly plan; it usually meets on the basis of actual issues prompted by a question or a change in the world of 
labour or in society in general.
Based on the interviews it is apparent that social partners assume that the government uses PCF as a 
facade to pretend there is social dialogue and to give the impression of maintaining a democratically functioning 
tripartite system. Through this forum, the government seeks to provide legitimacy to its decisions – so believes 
15 Democratic Confederations of Free Trade Unions (LIGA; Független Szakszervezetk Demokratikus Ligája), National Confederation of 
Hungarian Trade Unions (MSZOSZ; Magyar Szakszervezetek Országos Szövetsége), National Confederation of Workers’ Coun-
cils (MOSZ; Munkástanácsok Országos Szövetsége).
16 Confederation of Hungarian Employers and Industrialists (MGYOSZ; Munkaadók és Gyáriparosok Országos szövetsége), National 
Federation of Consumer Co-operative Societies and Trade Associations (ÁFEOSZ-KÉSZ; Általános Fogyasztási Szövetkezetek és 
Kereskedelmi Társaságok Országos Szövetsége), National Association of Entrepreneurs and Employers (VOSZ; Vállalkozók és 
Munkáltatók Országos Szövetsége).
17 In press this agreement is referred to as “six-year wage agreement”, however from the text it is difficult to assume whether an 
agreement was reached for the post-2019 era.
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a representative of an employers’ organization. This interviewee provided a very simple yet concrete example 
to illustrate the ill-functioning of the system. The government has recently decided to amend the regulation on 
fringe benefits, withdrawing most of them from the system. A day before the PCF ad hoc meeting a brief, one-
page working document was provided to all the participants of the meeting. „During the meeting the govern-
ment representative used indicative mode, without taking on board any of our opinions, [even though] both the 
union and the employer representatives thought that this might not be the best idea [to eliminate fringe benefits 
from the system]”. In July 2018, trade union members of PCF intended to organise nation-wide demonstrations 
if the government refused negotiations about fringe benefits and related tax exemptions.18 Later on a social de-
bate has evolved in the government-critical, democratic media around the issue. „No substantial preparations 
were made for this decision. They did not send the material to us in time to enable us to prepare and respond 
professionally. We would have opened a professional debate about it within our organization, and if we had had 
a chance to call for a board meeting and to deliberate we would have come up with a written opinion. None of 
this happened”. Despite the resistance and difference of opinions the government put forward the agenda with-
out consulting any of the interest reconciliation forums, and the parliament voted on the proposal.
Likewise, issues quickly got politicized at PCG too, and debates proceed without professional consid-
erations or arguments pro- and contra. The same interviewee as above spoke about the complexity of the 
extra-pay benefits, how it would have required special expertise and exchange of professional opinions, that 
is both within the board of employers’ association and on the national tripartite forum. He/she thinks that 
this would have been a typically technical- professional question without any political connotations, yet the 
conversation did not focus on the possible impact and the professional background studies. “This is somehow 
a Hungarian disease that we quickly see things in black and white, in the framework of who is with me and 
who is against me, instead of taking the professional side of the question irrespective of which political block or 
view one belongs to”, by which he obviously refers to the deeply divided and polarized nature of the Hungarian 
society as such, and also to the fact that even so-called professional forums fall prey to such reflexes running 
deep in the society. The same decision-taking mechanism takes place about the transformation of the small 
business sector, following a relevant EU directive in this matter.
Conclusions
The change of legislation and thus the character of social dialogue also meant that positions represented 
by participants of such meetings stopped becoming binding for the government, opinions of the members of 
the tripartite system are being systematically ignored and consultations have no political, economic or social 
consequences. Formally, all the institutions of national level social dialogue are in place, occasional meetings 
are being held whenever the government finds it necessary to publicly legitimize its steps or decisions, and 
some of the concrete issues are being put on the table during such forums - but the mechanism and negotiating 
processes of such issues are seriously problematic. This practice constitutes procedural violations of democrat-
ic rules, not to mention the lack of any social, political or economic impact or any direct consequence of these 
national-level forum meetings. 
18 http://www.liganet.hu/news/9858/nyilatkozat.pdf
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In addition, it is worth noting that a clear political divide exists in interpreting the functioning and ef-
ficiency of the national level social dialogue in Hungary. Government-critical confederations and unions rep-
resented by the former agree that the social dialogue in Hungary has become an empty shell with formal 
procedures more or less in place, just to serve the current government, which uses it as a rubber stamp for its 
seemingly democratic decision-making processes. Confederations loyal to the government seem to challenge 
this opinion, or rather express their satisfaction with the forum and its mechanism, giving credit both to gov-
ernment and to other „constructive” participants in achieving positive outcomes. The employer organizations 
seem to be of mixed opinion - the organization we managed to talk to was very critical of the current proce-
dures, as is obvious from the above interview quotes. 
The dysfunctional character of the social dialogue on the national level has, not surprisingly, negative 
consequences on the lower levels of social dialogue too. The consequences are manifold, affecting the general 
support and smooth functioning of the unions at the local level. By stigmatizing the representatives of alter-
native opinions and turning them into political scapegoats, a general sense of fear and insecurity is created 
among existing union members and supporters. These processes lead to further deterioration of union support 
by its members, and serves as a major obstacle to further unionization. Another symptom that Hungarian un-
ionism has been struggling with since 1989 is related to the internal struggles and tensions between various 
confederations and the related unions, leading to a general fragmentation of the entire union system (Neu-
mann 2018). In the fight for union members, some of the confederations close to the political power-center 
have “poached” members on a large scale, going after entire unions with full membership (Neumann 2018, 
330). Since the return of the Orbán government to power in 2010, it has actively contributed to this fragmen-
tation, further enhancing and stimulating the weakening process of the unions (Neumann 2018, 331). Further-
more, the emptied out and thus meaningless national level mechanisms of SD create disillusionment and lack 
of interest among the representatives and likewise among those being represented.
Returning to the polarized scene of SD on the national level, it is apparent that two opposing tendencies 
or ambitions are at work, namely the governmental ambition to politicise matters and not to open professional 
debates as these are not the aspects which matter vs the union’s ambition (in most cases) to “bring down” 
decision-making from the political level and discuss those issues in a professional/ technical manner. However, 
the latter approach does not match the government’s ambitions, which aim at political alienation and exclu-
sion/ discrediting of representatives of alternative views without engaging in any professional discussion. On 
the contrary, politically independent unions and confederations while sensing their meagre chances of winning 
a political battle, technicalize the arising issues, that is, articulate them in technical-professional terms. Need-
less to say, the government has little in taking part in such debates, even if in some instances it actually adopts 
the SD partners’ recommendations later, without acknowledging or giving credit to it. 
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Sectoral and workplace level social dialogue
It has been pointed out by various authors that CEE industrial relations have become severely decentral-
ized in the last two decades or so (Glassner 2013, Meardi 2002, Varga 2013 quoted by Adascalitei–Guga 2015). 
The same is the case with social dialogue, since the state no longer supports unionization or takes the unions 
and confederations (where they exist) seriously (Adascalitei–Guga, 2015). Instead, most union activities and 
their mobilizing capacities get directed to the local level, which means a local union organization, a plant or 
workplace level unit of workers’ self-organization. This has been the case in Romania in the automobile sector, 
where plant-level union organizations turned out to be very successful in self-representation and achieving 
labour demands despite the increasingly hostile economic, legal and political environment. (Adascalitei–Guga 
2015) Similarly, in Hungary, local level unions in some cases turned out to be successful recently by being able 
to organize strikes or reaching near-strike situations as a result of which the plant management was forced to 
yield to their demands (Audi Hungária and Daimler–MB Kecskemét are good examples for this); in other sec-
tors local/ union level initiatives did not take place at all or remained highly unsuccessful. In the sections below, 
we will analyse two public sectors - education and health care – where, even if mobilization and some sectoral 
level efforts did take place, due to their market position/ low direct impact on the national and global markets, 
the bargaining power of these initiatives was not sufficient to convince the state to change its policies.
 As ethnographic studies of the local level enactments of SD are rare, and instead the literature usually 
applies a macro-perspective combined with an historic overview of TU traditions, we have decided to place 
two unsuccessful local/ sectoral efforts of the recent past under scrutiny, where different local and sectoral 
unions interacted and strove to engage in a meaningful SD with the state. Both these major attempts, which 
managed to mobilize not only the employees of the sector but the average citizens too (affected as ‘clients’ 
of the education and health care as major service sectors), were destined to failure due to structural factors 
presented in this text.
Sectoral level social dialogue does not have a long history in Hungary. One of the biggest obstacles is 
the weak institutional framework and the inadequate organization of social partners at this level. Even though 
Hungary’s accession to the European Union triggered some changes, this level of social dialogue is rather in-
active. The Sectoral Dialogue Council is a trilateral body composed of representatives of the employees’ and 
employers’ side of the sectoral dialogue committees and the minister. Its task is to provide an institutional 
framework for the coordination activities required for the operation of the sectoral social dialogue committees. 
The main task of the sectoral social dialogue committees is to promote balanced development of the sector, 
to implement an autonomous social dialogue at sectoral level, aiming at creating better working conditions, 
retaining jobs and promoting the legality of the labour market processes.  Currently there are 21 sectoral social 
dialogue committees; however, there are only three sectoral collective agreements in force.19
OKÉT is the high-level tripartite social dialogue forum for the whole public sector. It represents all of the 
employees who are engaged in the public sector, including public servants, civil servants, policemen, defence 
19 Social partners of sectoral dialogue committees are entitled to conclude collective agreement, and may request its extension via 
an administrative decision of the Minister of National Economy. These extended collective agreements are is the energy, the 
construction, and the catering, hotel and tourism sectors.
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force officers, members of the armed forces etc. This national tripartite forum was established in December 
2002, originally to deal with wage (salary) and employment policies and labour law related issues of the public 
sector in general, but today it serves the purposes of disseminating information rather than consultation. Be-
sides the OKÉT, there are some specific interest reconciliation forums in various branches of the public sector, 
such as the Labour Council for Public Service Employees (KOMT) and the Public Service Interest Reconciliation 
Forum (KÉF) for public officials. It holds consultations, delivers opinions, makes proposals, and discusses na-
tional strategies within its field of operation. The influence of the OKÉT is considered to be limited (for example, 
it has exercised no influence or voice over the series of important laws reshaping public administration and 
public services).
The most important forum for social dialogue in Hungary is enterprise level collective bargaining, as over 
90 per cent of collective agreements are concluded by single employers.20 Most of the interviewed employers’ 
association and trade union leaders agreed that social dialogue is more effective and vivid at company level as 
there is more space left for negotiations for the trade unions. Collective agreements can alter statutory condi-
tions not only to the advantage but also to the detriment of employees, as the Labour Code of 2012 enables 
parties to the employment contract to set certain conditions at a lower level than provided for by the law. 
However, individual level negotiations have a negative effect on employers’ willingness to bargain collectively. 
In the following section, our focus will be on two areas, both of high importance for Hungarian society 
and the economy. The first is the health care NESC sector, due to its crucial importance for society. Severe prob-
lems have occurred in this sector since the 1990s, across different governments. Health care is an issue which 
becomes politicized easily, and it is a sector which has been “under construction” for two and a half decades, 
very few systemic governmental reforms have been executed. Most of the measures failed because they were 
based on short-term political improvisation, often revoked soon in response to social resistance or protest.21 
Also, health care is the sector that has been hit the most severely by labour shortages since Hungary’s EU ac-
cession, as its workers have become mobile and often leave for West European countries. All these changes 
have an important effect on the sector itself, on the position of union representatives and on all participants 
NESC social dialogue.22 The second area of focus is the public education sector, another major public service 
system of the state, which is also a „problem area” of Hungarian society. Continuous reforms, the sharply fall-
ing results of students on ‘PISA’ tests,23 wage problems of teachers, recent centralization by the government, 
and drastically falling social prestige of teachers all point in the same direction, often labelled as the „general 
crisis” of the public education system. We chose to have a closer look at these two sectors also due to the fact 
that the state in these cases figures as an employer too, thus it allows us to get a better understanding of its 
role in this capacity as well. The following sub-section will attempt to introduce some of the main concerns 
20 National Labour Office database on collective agreements, http://mkir.gov.hu/lista2_1_3_1.php
21 For example a fee payable at the spot when visiting a family doctor, GP, to prevent the ’overuse’ of the public health care system 
(“vizitdíj”) had an extremely short and infamous history.
22 National Labour Office database on collective agreements. Available from: http://mkir.gov.hu/lista3_2_3_7.php
23 The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is a triennial international survey which aims to evaluate education 
systems worldwide by testing the skills and knowledge of 15-year-old students who are nearing the end of their compulsory 
education. PISA assesses how well they can apply what they learn in school to real-life situations.
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in these sectors, the scope for social dialogue and its failures, and also the alternative grassroots initiatives of 
teachers, conceived outside of the traditional trade unions as the response of their inefficiency to deliver to 
the expected level.
The health care sector
As suggested earlier, the Hungarian public health care sector struggles with multiple problems, including 
inefficiency, high costs, old infrastructure, “leakage” of the system (money disappearing), corruption, and an 
ageing population with bad health conditions, just to name a few major ones. In addition, the severe labour 
shortage, among both nurses and doctors, poses an enormous challenge. This situation has emerged NESC at 
the intersection of various negative processes: since the European labour markets have become accessible for 
the Hungarian workforce, large numbers of Hungarian nurses and doctors have chosen to work abroad, for sig-
nificantly higher wages and in much better working conditions. In parallel, the quality of the working conditions 
in state hospitals is sharply falling, and understaffing, lack of financial resources, stress, overload, and burnout 
are major issues both among nurses and doctors. 
Despite the negative tendencies in the health care job-market, trade unions active on the scene do 
not perceive their bargaining position as very strong. During the interviews conducted with trade union rep-
resentatives, different types of difficulties were articulated. On a national level, the major issue is political 
loyalty or “neutrality”, whatever this means. One of the major confederations appears to be „bought off by 
the government”, at least it does not seem to be expressing strong critical points against the government 
measures affecting the hospital staff negatively, or rather it behaves quite permissively, yet they cannot build 
a strong membership. As an interviewee stated “We cannot do more for the people if they don’t feel the need 
to join the union. There is this tendency in our region to expect others to act on their behalf...they don’t want 
to pay the union fees or to become active...In other cases, we try to fight for better working conditions for 
people...there was a case when we fought for less working hours... and instead of appreciating it, they will still 
take up extra-hours. Such people do not deserve to have a union” - a very critical, bitter opinion of a govern-
ment-friendly confederation leader, arguing that the fault is with the workers who can’t clearly see their own 
interests betray the goals represented by the union, and are ready to sell their labour cheap. Small, alterna-
tive trade unions take a much more critical stance towards government policies, however their position is not 
strong either.
The inactivity of workers and their lack of interest in joining a union is analysed differently by trade union 
leaders. On the one hand they think people do not join unions because they do not believe that collective bar-
gaining and exercising pressure can lead to substantial results. Behind this reasoning lies the idea that though 
Hungarian society needs changes from below, instead things happen in a top-down manner from the institu-
tional leaders or the state (or head of state). Second, even if people believe in collective action, they tend to 
„free-ride”, that is expect others to become union members and fight it out for all, or they expect leaders to 
fight things out.
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Lack of interest and inactivity of people in ’real life’ situations is often complemented with virtual activity 
on social media. Clearly the latter is effective in mobilization, but it is less effective when the need arises to 
demonstrate union power en masse, on the streets of Budapest or elsewhere, at union events. However, even 
demonstrating interest or virtual involvement is not without consequences – internet activities of employees 
are often monitored, policed, or clearly restricted by hospital management. “For instance in a hospital in town 
M, employees can’t express their opinion on FB, can’t press a like [to a post]. Fortunately, not everyone takes it 
seriously. There is certain activity on FB, but far fewer people speak up in real life.”
A wide-spread practice of the government is to divide trade unions. This harmful competition weakens 
the already not too strong membership of trade unions and has a detrimental effect on their capacity to influ-
ence the legislator. This practice can be demonstrated by the following example where the pro-government 
actor was able to deliver results, however they misperceived the real industrial needs.
As a response to the lack of nurses, public hospitals started hiring private nurses through agencies to 
ease the problem of understaffing.24 This widespread practice got into the national news during our fieldwork, 
in the month of September, 2018, when in an intensive unit of a provincial hospital in Western Hungary the 
entire emergency ward unit submitted its resignation to the hospital management. The reasons were under-
staffing and inadequate working conditions. (Later on, similar instances took place in some of the Budapest 
hospitals.) The hospital tried to mitigate the situation by inviting back retired nurses, hiring nurses through 
private agencies, and through internal rearrangement of workforce. 
To fill the gap with contracted nurses generates a lot of tensions within the system. The wage difference 
between the salaries of regular nurses working as public service employees and the salaries of contracted nurs-
es obviously creates a wage related tension. Those public service employee nurses who are unhappy with their 
salaries will themselves sign up for extra work to agencies in another shift as privately contracted nurses in an-
other hospital. They soon become overworked, tired, burnt out, and their family relationships suffer. However, 
this is the only way to survive financially as a nurse without leaving the profession or moving abroad. „People 
don’t work eight hours, but more, and this appears in statistics as if there were more people. There are a few 
full-timers, and then there is an additional team, which comes for a further four hours and for the night-shift. 
This makes the employees absolutely vulnerable because they need this extra income, especially in the country-
side, where only one hospital is available…they can’t go anywhere else. Thus, they suffer…” “Obviously few men 
tolerate it, maybe 80% of them don’t, if a woman works so much, if mum is never at home…. It is obvious that 
families are prone to fall apart more easily in this tense work-schedule than under normal working conditions”
Nurses often work 36 hours in a row and juggle between three or four workplaces so they can obtain a 
few hundred thousand forints extra. At the same time their responsibility is enormous, and they can be easily 
be held responsible by their superiors for treatments they had to conduct under less than ideal working and 
material conditions. This is a slippery terrain where even the smallest mistake can be easily used against them.
24 The interviewee representing an independent trade union of health care workers explains that the deficit of nurses is now a per-
manent crisis. According to the Chamber of Hungarian Healthcare Workers (MESZK), compared to the standard of developed 
West European countries, 25-26 thousand nurses are missing from the Hungarian system.
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Despite their vulnerability most of them do not join any of the trade union movements, even though 
theoretically the extreme shortages of employees may increase their bargaining power and their precarious 
situation could function as a strong motivating factor.25 ”And therefore, even if we should become stronger, they 
do not participate in trade union activities. People are so exhausted, so tired that when they go home, they just 
go to sleep and then go to work again, just able to meet their minimal needs…Exhausted, tired, and everyone is 
afraid that if they speak up in their own interest, it will lead to very bitter consequences, they will lose their jobs.”
Such situations in the health care sector lead to segmentation of the workforce, alienation, a feeling of 
being threatened, and weakening voices of labour self-representation without the mass support of workers. 
In this situation, the government is directly interested in silencing any collective claims, its interest being to 
preserve alienation and the sense of fear. For this, political tools are being used just like on the national level of 
SD, by creating political enemies out of dissident voices, eliminating them (e.g. sacking hospital directors who 
speak about critical conditions in the hospitals), while pre-empting any union claims by re-employing nurses 
(from other hospitals, through agencies) on a private basis. Partial privatization of the Hungarian health care 
sector is a large topic beyond the scope of this article; here we would only like to highlight its negative conse-
quences for the union movement and the entire sectoral SD.
2. Public education
Between 2015 and 2017 a clearly articulated and dynamic social movement emerged in Hungary in the 
form of street protests, civil disobedience activities and other forms of social resistance. Some of the teachers 
started wearing checked shirts as a protest, in the words of one of the leading politicians from the governing 
party presenting teachers in a negative light as “unkempt” and unprofessional. Entire teacher collectives began 
posting photos on Facebook wearing checked shirts, followed by a mass movement first in the virtual world, 
later on the streets26. Alliances with other civil initiatives were identified and established during the peak peri-
od of the movement, thus broadening the social resistance and building a common language.
Their major claims included decentralization of the education system, reducing the workload of both 
teachers and students, shifting emphasis from lexical knowledge to improvement of competences. Though 
partial, mostly cosmetic structural changes have been achieved, real decentralization or major revision of the 
curricula did not take place, and the authoritarian techniques of the ministry of human resources where edu-
cation belongs, have remained largely unchanged. Moreover, centralization and total control continues, for in-
stance the ministry is pushing out alternative textbooks from the market and trying to create a fully centralized 
system of teaching material without giving the freedom of choice to the teachers, a general practice since the 
1990’s. While the government gave only political answers by threatening teachers who joined the movement, 
by individually tailored political attacks through government-friendly/ public media against the leaders of the 
movement, the educational grassroots movement was busy working on technical answers to issues raised 
25 Like it happened in the automotive sector where collective bargaining and strikes resulted in higher wages and better working 
conditions.
26 A few examples from the government-critical media: https://444.hu/2016/02/17/kockas-ingben-allnak-ki-a-diakok-a-kockas-ingbe-
bujo-tanaraik-mellett, https://index.hu/belfold/2016/02/17/a_nap_amely_divatta_tette_a_kockas_inget/.
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during the protest, even though in some instances signs of politicization, a general criticism of the regime ap-
peared from time to time.
By the time of our research, street protests connected to demands concerning public education had 
gradually died out. The 2018 April election results, bringing a sweeping victory for the governing party, meant 
a decisive momentum in this process, namely loss of hope and a recognition that previous efforts have not 
reached their goal, as an interviewee involved in the ‘Tanítanék’ movement27 summarized it. According to their 
reading of the developments, no forms of social resistance have led to tangible results, and large segments of 
Hungarian society remain passive, silently supportive of the oppressive structures and practices of the current 
regime.
The high level of social mobilization was unsustainable, especially as all their activists were full-time 
teachers, struggling with daily issues of teaching, not finding enough time for movement-related activities on 
a regular basis. Instead, what remained by the end was only a handful of burnt out activists. In addition, the 
government-controlled media easily targets and destroys such people, as they are few and without a mass 
support backing them. 
In addition, internal tensions could be detected between traditional trade unions and such new, grass-
roots social movements, based on the interviews organized around the theme of the major street protests 
related to public education and the “checked-shirt” movement. The alternative movements felt that trade un-
ions succumbed to too many compromises with the government during the negotiation period of 2015-2017. 
Lack of support from established trade unions was felt when independent movements initiated an action, our 
interviewee added.
Perhaps the most important professional result of the social movements in the area of public education 
was a professional document and common understanding called Educational Minimum: a declaration and pro-
gram prepared by professionals of the ‘Tanítanék’ movement on the most essential and urgent reforms needed 
in the public education system. It has included a political commitment as well, signed by all the oppositional 
parties before the 2018 national elections. The election results, the return of the ruling party with a two-third 
majority erased all high expectations and pushed the entire movement into deep crisis and hopelessness. 
“Nothing is left of it by now…I guess we need some time to recover from this and rethink the possibilities…2–3 
of us are left from the movement…I guess in a year’s time I will be leaving the teaching profession, and maybe 
the country as well…” -  thus closes our discussion our interviewee from the ‘Tanítanék’ movement.
27 „Tanítanék” movement was the umbrella organisation for public education teachers during the protest. Tanítanék literally means „I 
would teach” in Hungarian, refers to a famous line of the Hungarian poet, Attila József, but also to the inability of thousands 
of teachers in the public education to teach under „normal” circumstances, without being exposed to daily politics,  lack of 
resources, constant reforms and reorganizations, heavy work overload, excessive administration and other challenges.
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Conclusion
Based on the SD events of the recent past in the two sectors briefly introduced above (health care and 
education), it can be concluded that social dialogue remains unsuccessful in some sectors, even if it achieves 
smaller or larger, but definitely local level victories in other sectors, like in the automobile industry. For specific 
structural (economic and political) reasons, health care and education are not sectors where unions’ demands 
are easily heard by the state. It can also be concluded that in these sectors, SD cannot really be substituted 
by alternative modes or ways of claim-making. The cases examined suggest that alternative ways remain in-
effective in the long-term, bringing only partial successes in isolation, and in the short-term, without having 
the capacity and resources to expand and attract large masses, thus achieving a real social impact or change. 
Despite the severe and long-lasting social injustices and increasing precarity of workers in various sectors of 
the Hungarian labour market (including health care and education), workers’ support for trade unions has not 
increased, which means that the unions could not really capitalize on the situation. However, this is not nec-
essarily their “fault”, it is more part of the “game”, of the nature of the increasingly authoritarian or as it likes 
calling itself, illiberal political regime developed in Hungary by the ruling party by the end of 2010’s.
This is a political regime built on fragmentation of society, on individual fears (for further evidence see 
content of the public media), where existential anxieties overrule the possibility of a strong collective action led 
by the unions. What remains instead, to “let out the steam” accumulated by the worsening conditions and in-
creasing precarity is various virtual activities on social media, such as facebook. People share their opinion, ex-
periences, and views, while others fear to even do that due to the sense of increasing state surveillance. What-
ever is the situation in the virtual spaces, it has to be noted that its impact is limited - even though theoretically 
it could mobilize to action and unite, in most cases it remains a tool of “armchair democracy”, allowing people 
to comment, providing a false sense of participation, but in reality such individuals remain passive onlookers 
of socio-political events. It is legitimate to ask why people retreat into such passive forms of social action or 
participation. Many are overworked, as presented through the case of health care workers, they work in several 
shifts and do not find time to get involved in union activities. In addition, workers have an increasing sense of 
precarity, understanding that the changed Labour Code (2012) does not protect them sufficiently. In addition, 
the state/ ruling party keeps increasing its surveillance of state employees, public sector employees (like the 
teachers and health care workers in the hospitals), therefore existential fear (fear of losing one’s job) domi-
nates. Being overworked, feeling alone, and afraid does not motivate people to spring into collective action. 
In terms of the politization of the conflict, the government tried to prevent it becoming professional or 
technical, and managed to keep it in the realm of the political. On the opposite side, the grassroots movement 
worked on professional/ technical answers for the problems raised in the area of public education, but at the 
same time, especially during street protests and moments of mass mobilization, managed to articulate political 
messages as well, messages of discontent and criticism of the regime. However, neither of these efforts were 
sustainable in the long run due to the character of the regime they were opposing.
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Final conclusions
As the above parts of the texts pointed out, social dialogue in Hungary does not fulfil its role either at 
the national, sectoral, or workplace level. It cannot fulfil its role for numerous reasons. Institutions of social 
dialogue are in place and operate, meeting the formal criteria of democratic provisions. However, some of the 
legal solutions do not meet international standards, especially that of the ILO on tripartite social dialogue, and 
some of them bypass democratic legislative process, like the establishment of the PCF by a civil law contract. 
Social dialogue as a democratic process is dysfunctional due to the fact that these institutions and mechanisms 
are not implemented in a democratic way, and no real dialogue or actual debates take place. Instead, these 
mechanisms work in a top-down manner: the illiberal state and its central governing bodies expect certain solu-
tions and answers, leaving no scope for a transparent democratic dialogue with the relevant social partners. 
If the entire system, as pointed out at different parts of this text, is dysfunctional and does not fulfil its 
function in the society, why is it still present? Why is the government keen to preserve it? It uses institutions of 
social dialogue to preserve the image and impression of a democratically functioning state of the EU; however, 
not surprisingly, it is unable, and it seems unwilling, to preserve the values and achievements of the European 
social model. This also means that the current government is severely misusing the institution of social dia-
logue to legitimate itself, its political tactics and broader strategies within the EU.
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